On Understanding a Theory on Conscious Experiences by Erhan Demircioğlu
75
Croatian Journal of Philosophy
Vol. XVII, No. 52, 2018
On Understanding a Theory 
on Conscious Experiences
ERHAN DEMIRCIOĞLU
Koç University, Istanbul, Turkey
McGinn claims, among other things, that we cannot understand the the-
ory that explains how echolocationary experiences arise from the bat’s 
brain. One of McGinn’s arguments for this claim appeals to the fact that 
we cannot know in principle what it is like to have echolocationary ex-
periences. According to Kirk, McGinn’s argument fails because it rests 
on an illegitimate assumption concerning what explanatory theories 
are supposed to accomplish. However, I will argue that Kirk’s objection 
misfi res because he misapprehends McGinn’s argument. Further, I will 
articulate and briefl y assess some ways in which McGinn’s argument 
can be blocked.
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McGinn (1989) claims, among other things, that we cannot understand 
the theory that explains how echolocationary (or batty) experiences 
arise from the bat’s brain. One of the infl uential arguments McGinn 
develops for this claim appeals to the fact that we cannot know in prin-
ciple what it is like to have batty experiences. According to Kirk (1991), 
McGinn’s argument fails because it rests on an illegitimate assump-
tion concerning what explanatory theories are supposed to accomplish. 
However, my main aim in this note is to show that Kirk’s objection 
misfi res because he misapprehends McGinn’s argument. The objection 
that I will consider is somewhat old but I hope this does not by itself 
detract from its signifi cance. The sort of misunderstanding of McGinn’s 
argument that is encapsulated in Kirk’s objection has not been suf-
fi ciently recognized in the literature, which might explain at least in 
part the general tendency many philosophers seem to have of rejecting 
McGinn’s overall account out of hand. After answering Kirk’s objection, 
I will articulate and briefl y assess some ways in which McGinn’s argu-
ment can be blocked.
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1. It is widely assumed that we human beings cannot know in prin-
ciple what it is like to have batty experiences. There is a clear sense in 
which the characteristic qualitative aspect, or the phenomenal charac-
ter, of the experiences bats have when they navigate the environment 
by using their echolocationary techniques appears to be irredeemably 
beyond our cognitive grasp. Batty experiences will never be intelligible 
to us, it seems, in the way our experiences like smelling a skunk or 
tasting coffee are.1
What follows from our lack of access to batty experiences? In par-
ticular, does our failure to access batty experiences provide any support 
for the following thesis?
(T) We cannot understand the theory that explains how batty expe-
riences arise from the bat’s brain.
McGinn argues that (T) is supported by the fact that we cannot access 
the phenomenal character of batty experiences:
Call this type of experience [batty experience] B, and call the explanato-
ry property that links B to the bat’s brain P1. By grasping P1 it would be 
perfectly intelligible to us how the bat’s brain generates B-experiences, we 
would have an explanatory theory of the causal nexus in question…But 
then it seems to follow that grasp of the theory that explains B-experiences 
would confer a grasp of the nature of those experiences: for how could we 
understand that theory without understanding the concept B that occurs 
in it? How could we grasp the nature of B-experiences without grasping 
the character of those experiences?...Our concepts of consciousness just are 
inherently constrained by our own form of consciousness, so that any the-
ory the understanding of which requires us to transcend these constraints 
would ipso facto be inaccessible to us. (McGinn 1989: 355–6)2
McGinn’s argument here is, roughly, this: (fully) understanding a the-
ory that explains how B-experiences arise from the bat’s brain requires 
us to grasp the concept B that (ineliminably) occurs in that theory,3 
which in turn requires us to grasp the character of those experienc-
es; however, we just cannot grasp the character of those experiences; 
therefore, we cannot understand the theory that explains how B-expe-
riences arise from the bat’s brain.
In a more explicit form, the argument runs as follows:
(1) Understanding a particular theory requires grasping all the con-
cepts that occur in that theory.
1 Nagel’s seminal paper (1974) played the main role in forcefully bringing to the 
attention of philosophers the signifi cance of our epistemic position with respect to 
batty experiences for the mind-body problem.
2 All McGinn references are to this work.
3 McGinn does not explicitly state but presumably takes for granted that 
the qualifi cations in the parentheses (‘fully’ and ‘ineliminably’) are necessary 
for the argument to get off the ground. If understanding were taken as partial 
understanding, or if B were a concept that eliminably occurs in the theory, the fi rst 
premise of McGinn’s argument would be obviously false. Having noted that, I will 
suppress these qualifi cations in the remainder of the paper.
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(2) The concept B occurs in the theory that explains how B-experi-
ences arise from the bat’s brain. 
From (1) and (2), it follows that 
(3) Understanding the theory that explains how B-experiences arise 
from the bat’s brain requires grasping the concept B. 
We also independently have the following:
(4) We can grasp the concept B only if we can grasp the character of 
B-experiences.
(5) We can grasp the character of B-experiences only if we can have 
B-experiences.4
(6) We cannot have B-experiences.5
From (3)–(6), it follows that
(T) We cannot understand the theory that explains how B-experi-
ences arise from the bat’s brain.
Let’s call (1) the grasping requirement (GR); and, by taking special note 
of (1), let’s call this argument the argument from grasping.6
How is the argument from grasping related to the argument Mc-
Ginn develops for the sort of “mysterianism” he is best known for? 
According to McGinn’s mysterianism, we cannot understand (or are 
“cognitively closed” with respect to) the theory that explains how our 
experiences arise from our brains. Clearly, a straightforward adjust-
ment of the argument from grasping cannot support McGinn’s mys-
terianism simply because we possess concepts of our experiences and 
thereby know what our experiences are like. McGinn’s argument for 
his mysterianism, which I call the closure argument by elimination, 
runs roughly as follows: introspection and perception are the “two pos-
sible avenues open to us in our aspiration to identify P [the brain prop-
erty that is responsible for our consciousness]” (397), and neither can 
help us identify P—therefore, we cannot identify P, in which case we 
cannot solve the mind-body problem in the case of humans. The argu-
ment from grasping is presented by McGinn as “a further point” (355) 
in (and hence it is a digression from) his main discussion of whether 
introspection can enable us to get to P; and as such it stands on its 
own and is independent of the closure argument by elimination. Given 
the implications of its conclusion, the closure argument by elimination 
4 It is clear that the argument could have been stated by simply having ‘We 
can grasp the concept B only if we can have B-experiences’ as a premise instead of 
having both (4) and (5). However, I here stick with the way McGinn seems to prefer 
to state it.
5 Premises (5) and (6) are not explicitly stated in the passage quoted from McGinn, 
but the context surrounding the passage leaves no doubt that McGinn holds them.
6 I claim that the argument from grasping is one plausible and textually 
supported interpretation of McGinn’s argument in the relevant passage, while I do 
not wish to claim that it is the correct one. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for 
pressing on this issue.
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is bound to be more controversial than the argument from grasping7; 
however, it seems to me that the latter also brings out some interesting 
issues and deserves a separate and focused investigation.
What, one might reasonably wonder, if the argument from grasping 
succeeds in establishing (T)? What is the signifi cance of the purported 
truth that we cannot understand the theory that explains how B-expe-
riences arise from the bat’s brain? As McGinn sees it, nothing less than 
the possibility of our achieving “a general solution to the mind-body 
problem” (356) is at stake. If (T) is true, then, according to McGinn, 
“even if we could solve [the mind-body problem] for our own case, we 
could not solve it for bats or Martians” (356). Of course, such a result 
would be especially worrisome for a variety of reductionist views on 
consciousness: if B-experiences are nothing but some physical features 
of the bat’s brain, as physicalism claims them to be, or if they are noth-
ing but some causal-role properties of the bat’s brain, as functionalism 
claims them to be, then what can possibly obstruct our path to solving 
the mind-body problem for bats? The question, I believe, is forceful: it 
certainly seems that the truth of (T) would be a mystery if some form 
of reductionism were true.
I believe McGinn’s account has not received the due attention it 
deserves, and I am largely in agreement with Kriegel’s following obser-
vation: “The literature on mysterianism has so far been somewhat dog-
matically dismissive. Critical discussions of the merits and demerits of 
the view are few and far between. In particular, McGinn’s argument is 
rarely if ever engaged” (2009: 455). The current paper may be read as a 
modest attempt to remedy this unfortunate situation by focusing on a 
particular but signifi cant strand in McGinn’s position. In what follows, 
I will argue against the objection Kirk develops against McGinn’s argu-
ment. Once a misunderstanding like Kirk’s is eliminated, the ground 
is cleared for drawing out the full implications of McGinn’s argument. 
I will conclude by suggesting a trilemma, one that captures the options 
available for resisting the argument and thereby functions as an invi-
tation for the potential dissidents to clarify their stand.
2. Kirk argues that McGinn’s argument in the passage quoted above 
assumes that “a satisfactory theory of explaining the nature of sub-
jective experience must be capable of actually conferring concepts of 
experience on those who start off without them” (Kirk 1991: 20).8 Let 
us call this assumption the conferring requirement (CR). So, we have 
the following:
(CR) A theory of conscious experience is explanatorily satisfactory for us (or 
for cognitive beings in general) only if it is capable of conferring a grasp of 
the concepts of conscious experience involved in that theory to (those of) us 
(or cognitive beings in general) who start off without (or who do not have an 
independent grasp of) them. 
7 For a critical discussion of McGinn’s mysterianism, see Sacks (1994).
8 All Kirk citations are to this work.
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By Kirk’s lights, CR “is illegitimate” (19) because it requires the ex-
planatory theory to achieve something no theory can possibly achieve 
and can therefore be reasonably expected to achieve. Grasping concepts 
of experience requires “an actual sort of experience of the right sort,” 
which is “something no theory could supply” (19). Holding that the ex-
planatory theory should confer a grasp of such concepts as B is, Kirk 
argues, setting up “an insuperable hurdle” (21) for that theory; and, if 
we fail to get over it, then it is not our cognitive powers but that very 
hurdle itself that should deserve the blame.9
According to Kirk, if CR were legitimate, i.e. if it were required for 
a satisfactory theory of conscious experience that it confer concepts of 
experience on those who start off without them, then the proper conclu-
sion to be drawn would be that no theory can meet that requirement 
and hence there cannot be such a satisfactory theory, one that is a pos-
sible object of our understanding. Therefore, Kirk fi nds it “puzzling” 
(19) that McGinn assumes the legitimacy of that requirement while 
holding that there is a satisfactory theory of conscious experience.
Let us assume, for the moment, that McGinn endorses CR. How, 
then, would the argument for (T) proceed? It is evident that in the pas-
sage above, McGinn’s main intention is to develop an argument for (T), 
but it is not at all clear how the argument can possibly be intended 
to move from CR. CR states that the explanatory theory in question 
should confer a grasp of the concept B, and (T) states that we cannot 
understand that theory. However, if the explanatory theory confers a 
grasp of B, as CR says it must, then what reason can we possibly have 
to think that (T) is true? If anything, just the opposite appears to be 
correct: holding CR provides a good reason for thinking that (T) is not 
true. That the explanatory theory confers a grasp of B supports the 
conclusion that we can understand that theory.
The moral is that if McGinn were really to endorse CR, then what 
is, from his point of view, a formidable obstacle to our understanding 
the theory explaining batty experiences (namely, our apparent failure 
to grasp the concept B that occurs in that theory) would be overcome 
by what that theory confers. So, assuming that McGinn endorses CR 
9 I would like to note in passing that Patricia Churchland attributes to McGinn 
some other requirement that is relevantly similar to CR. In a rather belligerent 
response to McGinn’s (2014) review of her (2013), Churchland writes that McGinn’s 
account suffers from “a whopping fl aw” and that “no causal explanation for a 
phenomenon…should be expected to actually produce that phenomenon” (2014, 
emphasis original). On a natural interpretation, Churchland attributes to McGinn 
the requirement that a satisfactory explanation of a particular subjective experience 
must actually produce that experience in those who understand that explanation 
(the producing requirement, PR). PR follows from CR on the reasonable assumption 
that an explanation of a particular subjective experience can confer concepts of 
experience on those who start off without them only if that explanation can produce 
that subjective experience in them. I will not discuss Churchland’s attack on 
McGinn’s position separately but I am confi dent that what I have to say below about 
Kirk’s critique applies mutatis mutandis to it.
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faces the diffi culty of giving a reasonable (and charitable) account of 
how McGinn’s argument for (T) can possibly proceed.
The argument intended by McGinn for (T), I claim, is the argument 
from grasping, and as such, it has nothing much to do with (more spe-
cifi cally, neither assumes nor needs to assume) CR. So, regardless of 
whether Kirk shows the illegitimacy of CR, he fails to properly address 
McGinn’s argument from grasping. Furthermore, if McGinn neither as-
sumes nor needs to assume CR in his argument for (T), then there need 
not be anything “puzzling” in McGinn’s commitment to the thesis that 
there is a satisfactory theory of conscious experience.10
3. Despite what I have argued for above, there is a particular statement 
in the passage above that might well give the impression that McGinn 
endorses CR. To quote again, McGinn writes: “it seems to follow that 
grasp of the theory that explains B-experiences would confer a grasp 
of the nature of those experiences.” Kirk (19) places a special emphasis 
on this statement and takes it as evidence for the claim that McGinn 
endorses CR.
However, McGinn’s statement at hand can be interpreted in a dif-
ferent way, and in a way that gives further support to interpreting Mc-
Ginn’s argument along the lines of the argument from grasping. In the 
relevant passage, McGinn can be plausibly taken as raising the follow-
ing question: “Assuming that we cannot have B-experiences, how can 
we possibly understand the theory that involves the concept B?” Having 
B-experiences would enable us to form the concept B that occurs in that 
theory. Barring that, McGinn argues, the relevant explanatory theory 
can be understandable by us only if it confers the concept B on us. Ac-
cording to McGinn, we can understand a theory only if we can grasp the 
concepts it involves (GR); and, if we do not have an independent grasp 
of some of those concepts (i.e. if we do not have a grasp of those concepts 
prior to our exposure to the theory), then we can understand the theory 
only if it confers on us such a grasp. That theories must confer on us a 
grasp of some concepts that we do not have an independent grasp of if 
10 It might be objected that McGinn is committed to the thesis that CR holds 
(if not for us) at least for some beings (e.g., those beings that are “cognitively open” 
to the relevant theory) and therefore that Kirk’s objection to McGinn’s account 
stands untouched by my point above. However, there is at least one good reason to 
think that McGinn is not committed to the idea that CR holds for some beings. It is 
important here to note the distinction McGinn makes between absolute and relative 
cognitive closure: “A problem is absolutely cognitively closed if no possible mind 
could resolve it; a problem is relatively closed if minds of some sorts can in principle 
solve it while minds of other sorts cannot” (360). McGinn also writes: “It certain 
seems to be at least an open question whether the problem is absolutely insoluble; 
I would not be surprised if it were” (361). Now, if McGinn grants the possibility of 
absolute cognitive closure, as he clearly does, then there might well be no minds that 
are cognitively open to the theory that explains B-experiences. However, given that 
McGinn holds that there is such a theory, then from his point of view, there being 
such a theory has nothing to do with its potential to endow some beings with a grasp 
of B because there might well be no such beings.
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they are to be understandable by us follows from GR (more on this be-
low). Therefore, GR is the claim that Kirk needs to attack if he wishes 
to undermine McGinn’s argument for (T).11 What McGinn has to say 
about conferring ultimately depends upon the GR he takes for granted.
Under this interpretation, the statement that Kirk focuses on does 
not commit McGinn to CR. CR is a requirement that theories that in-
clude some concepts that we don’t have an independent grasp of must 
satisfy in order for them to be explanatorily satisfactory. According to 
Kirk, McGinn commits “the error of assuming that a satisfactory theory 
must actually endow us with concepts for characterizing experience” 
(22, emphasis mine). However, McGinn’s statement at hand is about 
a requirement that those theories must satisfy in order for them to be 
understandable by us (the understandability requirement, UR). So, we 
have the following:
(UR) A given theory is understandable by us (or cognitive beings in general) 
only if it is capable of conferring a grasp of those concepts involved in that 
theory to (those of) us (or cognitive beings in general) who start off without 
(or who do not have an independent grasp of) them.
From UR, we can derive the following as one of its specifi c instances: 
(URE) A theory of conscious experience is understandable by us (or cogni-
tive beings in general) only if it is capable of conferring a grasp of those 
concepts of conscious experience involved in that theory to (those of) us (or 
cognitive beings in general) who start off without (or who do not have an 
independent grasp of) them.
For McGinn, if a theory that includes some concepts that we don’t have 
an independent grasp of does not confer a grasp of those concepts on us, 
then that theory is not understandable by us. However, the fact that 
a theory is not understandable by us does not mean that it does not 
satisfactorily explain what it is intended to explain. So, a theory that 
does not confer on us a grasp of the concepts that we do not have any 
independent grasp of, according to McGinn, is not understandable by 
us but might still be explanatorily satisfactory.12
11 Interestingly, Kirk explicitly accepts at one point GR. He writes: “Having 
concepts such as B is necessary in order to understand the theory that explains the 
character of B-experiences” (21). Given this, one might fi nd it “puzzling” that Kirk 
accepts GR but still attacks what McGinn has to say about conferring. Of course, 
the puzzle dissolves once we realize that what McGinn has to say about conferring 
has nothing much to do with the CR Kirk attributes to him. This provides further 
support to my claim above that Kirk has misapprehended McGinn’s statement on 
conferring.
12 One might wonder what the argument from grasping would look like once 
McGinn’s UR (or URE) is taken on board. The revision required is minimal: replace 
(5) above by (5′) We can grasp the character of B-experiences only if either we 
can have B-experiences or the theory can confer on us a grasp of the character of 
B-experiences, and add as a new premise (7) The theory cannot confer on us a grasp 
of the character of B-experiences.
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4. As stated above, Kirk’s principal reason against CR is that there 
are no theories on conscious experiences that can possibly fulfi ll and 
can therefore be reasonably expected to fulfi ll it. Since McGinn does 
not embrace CR, I will not spend time on Kirk’s argument against it. 
However, one might develop an analogous argument against URE and 
argue that because there are no theories on conscious experiences that 
can possibly fulfi ll and can therefore be reasonably expected to fulfi ll 
URE, it is illegitimate. If Kirk’s reason against CR is forceful, and if it 
works equally effectively against URE, as one might reasonably argue, 
then pointing at the fact that Kirk misidentifi es the requirement Mc-
Ginn embraces does not fully circumvent the problem that Kirk thinks 
affl icts McGinn’s account. If so, it might be maintained that the real 
issue with McGinn’s position has not yet been brought into relief.
By Kirk’s lights, CR is “illegitimate” because it requires an explana-
tory theory of conscious experience to achieve something no theory of 
conscious experience can possibly achieve and can therefore reason-
ably expected to achieve: given that no explanatory theory can confer 
on us concepts of conscious experience we do not have an independent 
grasp of, then CR sets an “insuperable hurdle” for such an explanatory 
theory to be satisfactory, which renders it illegitimate. The question I 
am concerned with now is how compelling an objection to URE, which 
is similar in spirit and form to Kirk’s objection to CR, would be. The 
objection is this: given that no theory of conscious experience that in-
volves some concepts of conscious experience that we do not have an 
independent grasp of can confer a grasp of those concepts on us, URE 
sets up an “insuperable hurdle” for such a theory to be understandable 
by us. Therefore, the objection goes, URE cannot be a requirement that 
we can reasonably expect theories of conscious experience should meet 
in order for them to be understandable by us.13
In response to this, I would like to concede two points. First, it is 
reasonable to derive the illegitimacy of a particular requirement from 
the fact that it cannot possibly be met by those on which it is placed 
as a requirement. This is, roughly, for the familiar reasons why many 
philosophers hold that ought entails can. Second, there are no theories 
on conscious experiences that can possibly satisfy URE. It is also worth 
noting that McGinn does not make any claim contradicting the former 
point and, more importantly, explicitly grants the latter point (p. 356) 
(just as would be expected given his intention to argue for (T): if there 
were theories that confer on us such a grasp, then that would be a rea-
son for thinking that (T) is not true).
However, I would like to argue that it does not follow from these two 
concessions that URE is illegitimate. The crucial point here is that URE 
is derived from UR and UR is intended to be a general requirement for 
all theories but not a local requirement solely for theories on conscious 
13 I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for the comment that led to a 
clearer statement of this objection.
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experiences. And, as such, the central rationale for UR derives from an 
eminently plausible general requirement about the conditions under 
which a theory is understandable by us, viz. GR: if we can understand 
a theory only if we can grasp all the concepts that occur in it (GR), 
then we can understand a theory that contains some concepts we do 
not have an independent grasp of only if it confers such a grasp on us 
(UR). Hence, pointing at the putative fact that there are no theories on 
conscious experiences that can possibly satisfy a particular instance of 
UR (viz. URE) cannot by itself show that UR as a general principle or 
URE as a specifi c instance of UR is illegitimate. The argument for the 
illegitimacy of URE needs to target the general principle from which it 
is derived (viz. UR) and needs to demonstrate that there are no theo-
ries on any areas of inquiry that can possibly satisfy it. And, the puta-
tive fact that UR cannot be satisfi ed by theories on a particular area 
cannot show that UR is illegitimate just as the fact that a particular 
person is incapable of fulfi lling a particular moral requirement cannot 
show that the requirement is illegitimate. If Dexter has an irresistible 
urge to commit murder and is incapable of acting in accordance with 
a commandment like ‘Thou shall not kill!’, then the proper conclusion 
to be derived is not that the commandment is illegitimate. Similarly, 
if theories on conscious experiences cannot satisfy the relevant specifi c 
version of UR (viz. URE), then the proper conclusion to be derived is 
not that that specifi c version is illegitimate.
Further, there are certainly theories that satisfy UR. Take for in-
stance Galileo’s theory of motion, where, on a standard history of sci-
ence, the concept acceleration is clearly introduced for the fi rst time 
in physics by distinguishing it from velocity. Assuming that we do not 
have an independent grasp of the concept acceleration, we can under-
stand Galileo’s theory of motion only if it confers on us a grasp of that 
concept that occurs in it. And the theory actually confers on us such a 
grasp by defi ning it in terms of some concepts that we already have an 
independent grasp of such as velocity and time.14 Plainly, examples can 
easily be multiplied indefi nitely.
The moral I draw is that UR is a general requirement that is sup-
ported by GR, which is itself another general requirement, and there-
fore, from the fact that there are no theories on conscious experiences 
that can satisfy one of its specifi c instances, it does not follow that that 
specifi c instance is illegitimate.
14 In this particular case, conferring takes the form of defi ning: the theory confers 
a grasp of a particular concept on the subject through defi ning it in terms of some 
of its other concepts. An interesting question is whether there are other forms the 
conferring relation in question might take, i.e., whether a theory can fulfi ll UR 
without defi ning the problematic concepts in terms of some other concepts. I myself 
cannot conceive any other way. That being said, however, I can fortunately sidestep 
the question for the purposes of this paper.
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5. Let me highlight the central points that have emerged in our discus-
sion. Firstly, the CR that Kirk thinks McGinn endorses is not an as-
sumption of the argument intended by McGinn, namely the argument 
from grasping. The argument from grasping stands untouched even if 
Kirk is right that CR is illegitimate. Secondly, there is good reason to 
think that McGinn does not endorse CR. The truth of CR would count 
against the truth of (T). Thirdly, McGinn holds UR, i.e., that a theory 
that involves some concepts we do not have an independent grasp of is 
understandable by us only if understanding it confers on us a grasp of 
those concepts. The constraint placed here by McGinn on theories con-
cerns their understandability by us and can be plausibly taken as fol-
lowing from GR; and as such, it does not entail CR. Fourthly, McGinn 
holds that there are not any theories of conscious experience that can 
satisfy UR.
The upshot is that McGinn does not endorse the CR Kirk attributes 
to him but endorses UR. Further, McGinn does not think the latter 
requirement is satisfi ed by theories on conscious experiences. All in all, 
Kirk’s attack leaves McGinn’s argument for (T) unscratched. 
6. I would now like to close the paper with articulating and assessing 
the ways I fi nd most plausible to block McGinn’s argument from grasp-
ing. Despite its sketchiness, I believe that this will be of value for at 
least one good reason. The discussion below will further attest to the 
force of the argument from grasping and invite the potential dissidents 
to clarify their stand.
It is clear that the argument is valid. Further, I hold that premises 
(1) and (6) are virtually unassailable—any attempt to block the argu-
ment by denying one of these premises is too desperate:
(1) Understanding a particular theory requires grasping all the con-
cepts that occur in that theory.
(2) We cannot have B-experiences.
This leaves us with premises (2), (4) and (5) as possible targets:
(3) The concept B occurs in the theory that explains how B-experi-
ences arise from the bat’s brain. 
(4) We can grasp the concept B only if we can grasp the character of 
B-experiences.
(5) We can grasp the character of B-experiences only if we can have 
B-experiences.
There are basically two different ways to attack these premises. First, 
one might deny (2). The most plausible way of attacking (2) is, it seems 
to me, to argue that it is based on the mistaken assumption that there 
are “concepts of consciousness” (McGinn) such as B. Concepts of con-
sciousness, as McGinn conceives them, are formed through the intro-
spective attention of the experiencing subject to the qualities of her ex-
periences. One might reasonably endorse eliminativism about concepts 
of consciousness and argue that there are no concepts satisfying the 
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conditions McGinn articulates15 (perhaps because, one might say, the 
whole idea of concepts of consciousness stems either from a mistaken 
picture of introspection as “turning one’s gaze inward” or from a faulty 
view about the qualities of experiences).16
Another way to attack the argument from grasping is to deny what 
is entailed by (4) and (5), viz. that we can grasp the concept B only if 
we can have B-experiences. According to this objection, there are con-
cepts of consciousness, as McGinn takes them to be, but grasping them 
does not require having the experiences that they refer to. The most vi-
able version this objection might take, I believe, endorses reductionism 
about concepts of consciousness and maintain that those concepts can 
be analyzed in terms of some other concepts the grasping of which does 
not require one to have any specifi c experiences. Take, for instance, 
those varieties of functionalism according to which there are causally-
based synonyms of concepts of consciousness. On such views, grasping 
a concept of consciousness is nothing more mysterious or demanding 
than grasping a concept describing a causal role. And, since grasping 
causal-role concepts does not require one to have any specifi c experi-
ences, as one might reasonably argue, phenomenal concepts qua caus-
al-role concepts do not also require one to have any specifi c experiences 
(including those experiences that they refer to). That is, if functional-
ism (or some form of reductionism about concepts of consciousness in 
general) is true, then either (4) or (5) is false.
So far as I can see, there are no other objections to the argument 
from grasping that are even remotely plausible. What I suggest, then, 
is a trilemma: either eliminativism or reductionism about concepts of 
consciousness, or (T). In slightly different words, if there are concepts 
of consciousness such as B that cannot be analyzed in terms of some 
other concepts that we possess, then (T) is inevitable—or so I have ar-
gued.17
15 An alternative way of denying premise (2) is to maintain that there are 
concepts of consciousness but they are not part of the relevant theory. As I see it, 
the idea here is not substantially different from eliminativism that I mention above. 
More specifi cally, this attack on (2) is eliminativism so far as the theory that explains 
how B-experiences arise from the bat’s brain is concerned. Therefore, at least for the 
purposes of this paper, the difference between the claim that there are phenomenal 
concepts but they are no part of the relevant theory and the claim that there are no 
concepts of consciousness tout court is not big enough to justify a separate treatment 
of the former. 
16 Note what McGinn says about how concepts of consciousness are related to 
introspection: “Our acquaintance with consciousness could hardly be more direct; 
phenomenological description thus comes (relatively) easily. ‘Introspection’ is the 
name of the faculty through which we catch consciousness in all its vivid nakedness. 
By virtue of possessing this cognitive faculty we ascribe concepts of consciousness to 
ourselves; we thus have ‘immediate access’ to the properties of consciousness” (354). 
McGinn’s description of “introspectively ascribed concepts” (354) is anything except 
uncontroversial. See, for instance, Dennett (1988).
17 It is worth noting that the trilemma in question raises a serious challenge for 
a popular physicalist strategy to block various arguments for dualism, often called 
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“the Phenomenal Concept Strategy” (PCS), a defi nitive thrust of which is a rejection 
of both conceptual eliminativism and conceptual reductionism (see for instance Loar 
(2004), Papineau (2004), Stoljar (2005), and Demircioglu (2013)). The challenge for 
PCS is to show either that the trilemma I have just stated is a false one (i.e., it does 
not exhaust all the (plausible) options that one might have concerning the argument 
from grasping) or that, despite appearances, (T) can be adequately accommodated by 
a sort of physicalism, a doctrine that has enough bite to deserve that title. It appears 
that in either way, PCS faces a tall order.
